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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the factors and theory behind the user-centered 
research that is necessary to create a successful game-like 
prototype, and user experience, for malicious users in a 
cybersecurity context. We explore what is known about successful 
addictive design in the fields of video games and gambling to 
understand the allure of breaking into a system, and the joy of 
thwarting the security to reach a goal or a reward of data. Based on 
the malicious user research, game user research, and using the 
GameFlow framework, we propose a novel malicious user 
experience design approach. 
CCS Concepts 
Human-centered computing →  Interaction design →  
Interaction design theory, concepts and paradigms 
Security and privacy →  Human and societal aspects of security 
and privacy →  Usability in security and privacy 
Keywords 
Malicious user experience design (UxD); addictive cybersecurity; 
cybersecurity and gaming; GameFlow framework 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a paper that outlines a framework for understanding the user 
experience of game players, or player experience (PX), Nacke and 
Drachen [1] point out that both the game system and the player are 
actors exerting influence on the experience of playing the game. 
The game system, in this case meaning the combination of what the 
game can do, what rules constrain play, and what affordances are 
offered to the player, creates the basis for the play experience. The 
player provides the context for the game, entering data via the game 
interface and receiving output via audio visual cues, causing 
changes in state that constitute playing the game. 
Applied to cybersecurity, this template reveals the secured system 
as providing the functionality of a sort of game, blocking some 
actions via constraints, and potentially offering other opportunities 
via vulnerabilities. The malicious user provides the context, 
entering data and receiving feedback, and may cause changes in the 
state that constitute a hack. This similarity, we argue, may not only 
appear on the surface in this comparison, and we use the 
comparison of game user and malicious user as a basis for design 
research into a system focused on meeting the needs of malicious 
users (below, we define “malicious user” to include any 
unauthorized user, regardless of motive, including profit [2]).   
In this paper we will explore the factors, and conduct initial user-
centered research, necessary to creating a successful game-like 
prototype, and user experience, for malicious users. The 
background research requires investigating factors that make a 
successful game, including what is known about successful 
addictive design in the fields of video games and gambling. We will 
review the traits of the user base addicted to those experiences and 
compare that user base to what is known about malicious users. The 
comparison of these two groups is intended to move beyond 
criminology-based theories for malicious user motivation and 
move our malicious user design project closer to designing 
experiences to specifically engage malicious users as if they were 
game users. In this, we are informed by Xu, Hu, and Zhang's study 
of six computer hackers in China as well as other research focused 
on explaining the behavior of malicious users [3]. While Xu et. al. 
combine routine activity theory, social learning theory, and 
situational action theory to explain the progression of computer use 
to malicious computer use, no part of that explanation touches upon 
the motivation provided by the systems themselves, or the activity 
necessary to hack them. This lack was common across 
criminology-based discussions on the personality traits of hackers 
[4]. Missing in most of these studies is a discussion of the hacking 
activity itself, the allure of breaking into a system, and the joy of 
thwarting the security to reach a goal or a reward of data.  
Flow theory and research seek to understand the “phenomenon of 
intrinsically motivated, or autotelic, activity: activity rewarding in 
and of itself (auto self, telos goal), quite apart from its end product 
or any extrinsic good that might result from the activity” [5].  Flow 
is a state of complete absorption in an activity, immersion is the 
experience of the flow state. While Rennie and Shore discuss the 
application of flow theory to the pleasure of hacking, they primarily 
approach this model in relationship to increasing proficiency in 
malicious computer use [6]. The work most aligned with our own 
research is that of Kevin F. Steinmetz’s discussion of hacking as a 
transgressive craft [7]. In his dissertation, he proposes seeing 
hacking as “a behavior driven by a desire to learn, grow, and excel,” 
and even points out that that the end product may not be as 
important as the activity of hacking [7]. He further describes 
hackers as creative, within the transgressive craft framework, doing 
things with tools in ways that were not initially intended. He also 
frames hacking communities as craft guilds, who work alone on 
individual projects, but come together to share information and 
improve the craft. 
As part of this exploration, we pose what might otherwise be 
termed “hackers” as a class of users, within a user experience 
design, or user-centered design, context. The term “malicious” is 
used as a signifier to differentiate what are commonly referred to 
as “hackers” from the users that computer software designers 
consider when designing systems, without excluding hackers from 
being considered as users of the system. Malicious users are 
different users than those considered in designing experiences for 
users of a system and are nearly always discussed as attackers rather 
than users. However, we argue that they remain a category of user 
in relationship to every system, especially networked systems. 
These malicious users experience a very different User Interface 
(UI), accessing systems via their own tools, via a command line 
showing responses from the system, or potentially creating their 
own UI. These users rely on both unintended and intended 
discoverability, and they are not interested in following the 
constraints of either the interface or the security.  
In looking for a user class that most closely parallels the attraction 
to a craft-like approach to a user interface, as well as the guild-like 
system of communication and sharing of knowledge and craft, we 
posit that hackers may be very similar to game users, particularly 
game users who may be described as addicted to, or with markers 
for potential addiction to, games. The similarity is underscored in 
Steinmetz's description of the activity of hacking: “often hacking is 
a solitary activity involving long hours in front a computer or other 
piece of technology, working away at it to accomplish a task or 
learn more” [7]. His description of the importance of community 
for learning could equally describe game communities: “in this 
sense, learning in a group setting accelerates the rate of learning by 
filling in the gaps in knowledge which might otherwise take a 
tremendous amount of time to overcome” [7]. Expanding malicious 
user research to include research on gaming and problem gaming 
allows us to develop a broader potential profile of malicious users, 
particularly in regard to immersion and flow states. 
Whereas most software is focused on usability in service of 
productivity, games are designed to provide entertainment [1]. 
Fields that involve usability tend to describe usability in service of 
functionality and productivity rather than entertainment and 
immersion. The field of Human Computer Interaction (HCI), 
rooted in ergonomics (the study of human efficiency in working 
environments) is tied to similar concerns in the workplace [8]. 
There are also fields of amusement and entertainment design, 
parallel to ergonomics, but, similar to the relationship between 
serious usability studies and game studies focused on making 
games more usable (i.e. fun), there is little crossover in studies 
between the two fields. These factors further underscore the 
“outsider” status of both malicious users and game users (as well 
as game designers), in relationship to productivity.  
However, there is increasing crossover between productivity-based 
user experience design and game mechanics in the form of 
gamification: the integration of game elements and game 
mechanics in productivity-related software [8]. As an example of 
game use in cybersecurity, picoCTF (capture-the-flag, CTF) is a 
security competition with a web-based game interface [9]. The 
competition uses a capture-the-flag game construct to “encourage 
greater computer science interest among high school student” [9]. 
While picoCTF employs a game to introduce cybersecurity to 
students, it does not gamify the malicious user experience. The 
picoCTF game was announced publicly as a game, students signed 
up for the competition, and were thus aware they were playing a 
game. Students playing picoCTF took on the role of malicious users 
but were not malicious users. The nature of the game was 
specifically designed as a visual story game called Toaster Wars, 
“to appeal to students who might not otherwise be interested in 
participating in a computer security competition” [9]. Capture-the-
flag has been employed as a cybersecurity game since at least 1996 
[10]. In a Jeopardy-style CTF games, players attempt to find hidden 
information (flags) planted in the game space. This “space” may be 
file systems or network-based services. Players take on the role of 
malicious users and attempt to exploit vulnerabilities to reach the 
flags.  
While CTF games approach cybersecurity training as play and 
locates that play inside the usual spaces of hacking (file systems 
and network-based services), they do not seek to immerse the game 
users. Players are aware that they are playing a game, acting as 
attackers and, in some CTF games, as defenders. The picoCTF 
game adds a narrative, and thus some level of immersion, to 
cybersecurity activity, but the visual overlay moves it outside the 
spaces that immerse actual malicious users: file systems and 
network-based services. While both may inform malicious user 
design, neither are specifically designed for malicious users. 
Some malicious users already approach hacking as a game. 
Turgeman-Goldschmidt claims that hackers “are offering society 
new rules for play” [11]. and that the hackers see their activity as 
fun, even thrilling, and ultimately not serious, despite also believing 
it to be subversive and a form of resistance to social order. This 
paper borrows from gamification approaches, to propose malicious 
user experience design as closer to game design (engagement and 
immersion) than software design (usability and productivity), or an 
extension of criminology. Overall, the goal of this research is to 
provide sufficiently solid user research on which to base a 
malicious user experience design prototype that can be combined 
with rapid testing and iteration.  
2. GAME USERS, ADDICTIVE PLAYERS 
AND PROBLEM GAMBLERS 
Defining the nature of addiction, and the point at which gaming 
(including gambling) becomes a problem is outside the scope of 
this paper. Instead, we will focus on factors that lead to intense 
interaction with both video games and video gambling, including 
literature that attempts to define and describe addiction. 
Researchers focused on game-related studies delineate between 
positive gaming behavior and behavior that becomes problematic. 
This is often defined at the point that gaming results in negative 
consequences [12]. However, from the perspective of cybersecurity 
(and, in most cases, a legal perspective) malicious users are 
engaged in behavior with negative (potential) consequences as soon 
as they begin using a system maliciously. From these perspectives, 
we pull equally from game research into “acceptable” game use and 
potentially problematic game use in order to conduct user research 
for malicious user experience design. 
2.1 General traits and motivations  
Kuss and Griffiths concentrated multiple findings into three key 
personality traits related to internet gaming addiction: 
“introversion, neuroticism, and impulsivity” [13]. Emond et al.   
found that problematic gambling was “inversely related to rational 
thinking and positively related to experiential thinking” [14]. They 
further state that experiential thinking may inhibit the use of 
instruction on gambling and probability having an effect on 
reducing gambling behavior, due to a resistance to 
rational/analytical thinking. Their study found that “dysfunctional 
coping, socialization and personal satisfaction serve as risk factors 
for developing Internet gaming addiction” [14]. In terms of 
detrimental gambling related conditions, the study found an inverse 
relationship between rational thinking and detrimental gambling, as 
well as a positive relationship between experiential thinking and 
detrimental gambling [14]. The same research also found that 
gambling behavior was resistant to education about probability 
(rational thinking).  
2.2 Social 
Loneliness and decreased social competence are experienced by 
game players who have high scores but also problems with 
compulsive game use [12]. At the same time, sociability and social 
elements of games “significantly predicted video game addiction” 
[12]. Game users with problematic game behaviors were also more 
likely to play games with a high social component “e.g., sharing 
tips and strategies, cooperating with other players, etc.” [15]. 
3. THE MALICIOUS USER 
Research into hacker motivation and personality is limited by the 
need to seek out people engaged in activity that is most often illegal, 
as well as socially unacceptable within wider society. Hackers 
engage in malicious use of systems for multiple reasons, including 
for financial gain [2], [16]. However, the research we reviewed on 
malicious users did not specifically investigate financially-
motivated malicious users. Their approach, and ours, treats hacking 
as a specific set of actions and defines hackers as those who engage 
in that activity.  
Pulling from existing studies of hackers that go beyond motivation 
and profiling from criminological theory, we have a rough outline 
of malicious users. They are more analytical and rational in their 
thinking, and have higher confidence in their decision making [17]. 
They see their actions as a form of entertainment rather than crime 
[11]. They are more open to change than they are concerned about 
conserving safety and security [18]. They rely on a social network 
consisting of different levels of skill ability, and give back to that 
community when they learn something new [7].  
3.1 General traits and motivations  
In a grounded theory study “designed to examine the social 
construction of the reality among Israeli computer hackers through 
the accounts they use to explain their deviant behavior,” Orly 
Turgeman-Goldschmidt conducted 54 interviews with Israeli 
hackers and found that they were motivated by fun, thrill, and 
excitement; curiosity and exploration, including voyeurism; power 
and dominance; economic justice; revenge; and ease of use [11]. 
Among other places, participants were sourced via advertisements 
in media, targeted ads at hacker conferences, and security 
conferences resulting in 51 interviewees that were men, with ages 
ranging between 14 and 48.5 years old. The research involved 
“approaching the hacker community to discover relevant categories 
and the relationships among them” via narrative interview [11]. 
Based on these interviews, Turgeman-Goldschmidt claims that 
“hacking is a new form of entertainment based on the play-like 
quality that characterizes the use of digital technology and is a new 
form of social activity” [11]. The hackers in his study see 
themselves as pursuing their malicious computer user goals in line 
with “values that are praised in today’s society: the pursuit of 
happiness, curiosity, and knowledge and the demonstration of 
computer virtuosity” [11]. In a review of malicious user motivation, 
Madarie found that openness to change, rather than safety and 
security values, correlated with willingness to circumvent system 
security. However, the study also found that intellectual challenge 
and curiosity are not related to frequency of hacking, leading to 
speculation that hackers may be “motivated by what they dislike 
instead of being motivated by what they value” [18].  
In a study on the personality characteristics of illicit computer 
hackers, Michael Bachmann found that successful hackers have a 
“strong preference for rational decision-making processes” [17]. 
This is a significant difference from the thinking style found in 
problematic game users. This disparity is key to our malicious user 
experience design research. If immersion, from a flow theory 
perspective, is important to capturing and holding the attention to 
gamers, and that immersion is rooted in gamers’ experiential 
personalities, where does that leave us if we want to capture and 
hold the attention of malicious users, who skew toward 
rational/analytical thinking rather than experiential? Malicious user 
experience design approaches will need to be immersive for 
rational/analytical thinkers. 
3.2 Social 
The malicious users in Turgeman-Goldschmidt’s study disputed 
the popular conception of hackers as loners, preferring lone 
computer use to human company [11]. Steinmetz sees the sharing 
of acquired knowledge as vital to the hacker community and 
suggests that there is social pressure to not only learn and improve, 
but to share what one has learned to help the entire hacker 
community to improve. The communities of learning he describes 
include passive learning via accumulated knowledge available 
online and active community events designed for knowledge 
sharing [7].  
4. FLOW THEORY AND 
CYBERSECURITY: THE RELEVANT 
PARTS 
Flow theory attempts to provide a model for enjoyable experiences, 
particularly those that are seriously engaging, or immersive, to the 
point of losing track of time, or having an altered sense of time, 
while the activity continues. The theory approaches the elements of 
enjoyment as universal [19]. Flow experiences consist of eight 
elements, as follows: 
(1) a task that can be completed; 
(2) the ability to concentrate on the task; 
(3) that concentration is possible because the task has clear goals; 
(4) that concentration is possible because the task provides 
immediate feedback; 
(5) the ability to exercise a sense of control over actions; 
(6) a deep but effortless involvement that removes awareness of the 
frustrations of everyday life; 
(7) concern for self disappears, but sense of self emerges stronger 
afterwards; and 
(8) the sense of the duration of time is altered. 
 
The combination of these elements causes a sense of deep 
enjoyment so rewarding that people feel that expending a great deal 
of energy is worthwhile simply to be able to feel it [15].  
4.1 Flow theory and gaming 
Sweetser and Wyeth adapted flow theory to gaming, creating the 
following new GameFlow categories: concentration, challenge, 
player skills, control, clear goals, feedback, immersion, social 
interaction [19]. Combined, these indicate that a game authored to 
create flow state should require and allow concentration; the game 
challenge should match the player’s ability; the player must be able 
to progress in skill to the point of mastering the game; the player 
should feel a connection between taking action and seeing a result 
in the game; the goals of each stage of the game should be clear; 
the game must provide feedback; the player should be immersed, 
becoming less aware of anything outside the game, losing sense of 
time; and the game should offer the opportunity for social 
interaction [19]. 
In a study of the relationship of appeal and immersion in video 
games, Georgios Christou highlights the importance of initial 
appeal in getting a game user to engage with the game, and the 
importance of immersion in drawing users into continuing to play 
and return to a game [20]. A study of flow as a predictor of video 
game addiction identified one factor, out of the nine original flow 
theory elements, as significant: “heightened levels of a sense of 
time being altered during play” [15]. To counter the loss of time 
that is prevalent for game users prone to addiction, the study 
suggests that games should make players aware of time passing. 
Like casinos, without clocks and wrapped in mazes of engagement, 
malicious user experience design should seek to do the opposite, to 
encourage immersion and loss of temporal awareness. 
4.2 Flow theory and cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity attempts to interrupt flow states. While studies on 
the relationship of flow state to gaming addiction delineate between 
the positive nature of a flow state and the point at which desire for 
the state becomes an addiction, from the perspective of 
cybersecurity, any flow state in a malicious user is negative (aside 
from flow achieved from pointing in the wrong direction, or at the 
wrong target). Rennie and Shore suggested that increased system 
security could interrupt flow states and progression as a hacker by 
reducing the initial effectiveness of scripts and tools used by “script 
kiddies” (i.e. entry-level malicious users that rely on tools built by 
more advanced malicious users) [6]. 
Sweetser and Wyeth’s GameFlow model posit flow as the singular 
goal of a game, a self-contained, rewarding experience. The reward 
is “a sense of discovery, a creative feeling of being transported into 
a new reality” [19]. We are left with the questions raised in section 
3.1 regarding the experientiality of game users and the rationality 
of malicious users. In Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the 
experience of flow, Dietrich claims that “a necessary prerequisite to 
the experience of flow is a state of transient hypofrontality that 
enables the temporary suppression of the analytical and meta-
conscious capacities of the explicit system” [21].  
This seems to support our concern regarding whether malicious 
user experience design can craft a flow state when the potential user 
base skews toward analytical thinking. However, further in the 
paper Dietrich discusses the merger of action and awareness and 
describes this form of immersion as the disappearance of self-
consciousness, no worry of failure, a sense of timelessness, and no 
distractions. From this viewpoint, remembering the self-confidence 
characteristic described by Bachmann [17], in the case of designing 
for malicious users, immersion is not experiential immersion but an 
engagement that supports self-confidence, encourages intensity 
that results in a loss of the sense of time, and provides no 
distractions (including the necessity of opacity, creating a belief 
that the system being used maliciously is not misleading or 
monitored). 
5. HONEYPOT DESIGN: MALICIOUS 
USER EXPERIENCE DESIGN? 
On the surface, much of the potential value of our research is 
already covered by the use of honeypots, which “lure a potential 
attacker by simulating resources having vulnerabilities and 
observing the behavior of a potential attacker to identify him before 
a damaging attack takes place” [22]. High-interaction honeypots 
can be tools to collect intelligence about what motivates malicious 
users and how they operate while hacking a system [23]. Gupta et 
al. extend the honeypot construct to include internal privacy 
controls, using a system they refer to as a “context honeypot”. In 
their proposed system, malicious users are lured using fake data that 
is similar to the real data a suspected (internal) malicious user is 
likely to see [24]. They further explore and quantify the concept of 
“opaqueness” as the aspect of the system that creates the impression 
that the honeypot is real, the responses are real, and the data they 
are accessing is real [25]. This is useful background research for 
the concept of malicious user experience design.  
However, honeypots, even “context honeypots” that anticipate 
potential malicious use and adapt to provide synthetic data similar 
to the sort of data the malicious user is seeking, as well as “high-
interaction” honeypots that include a full experience, remain firmly 
in the domain of criminology research and standard cybersecurity. 
Creating a honeypot is analogous to dropping a $20 bill on the 
ground to see who picks it up. The context honeypot is analogous 
to putting a camera in the lunchroom at work and stocking the 
refrigerator with food cartons. The honeypot provides an 
opportunity for crime, and may cross over to entrapment, inducing 
people to commit crimes that would not ordinarily commit [25], but 
even a honeypot that targets a specific user or class of users with 
specific types of data is a very shallow authored experience. We are 
interested in crafting a far more targeted immersive experiences, 
that are specifically user-centered, and crafted toward long-term 
“playability”. Beginning with a honeypot in mind would be far too 
limiting. Further research into honeypots, both as a starting point 
for luring and as a source of information about opaqueness, is 
warranted. Given the level of interaction available via existing 
honeypot software and approaches, we do not see the results of this 
research (ultimately, prototype systems) resembling existing 
honeypots.  
6. DIRECTIONS: FACTORS IN 
DESGINING FOR THE MALICIOUS USER 
Based on the malicious user research, the game user research, and 
using the GameFlow framework, we can begin to outline a 
malicious user experience design approach. GameFlow applied to 
malicious users sketches a rough outline of the prototype: 
challenging tasks with clear goals that can be accomplished, and a 
system that provides immediate feedback. We are interested in 
crafting targeted immersive experiences that are specifically 
malicious user-centered and crafted toward long-term 
“playability”.  
6.1 Deception 
Bob Blakley says that a malicious user “should get a really bad 
experience, that we're designing to be bad” [26]. Blakley suggests 
the user experience goals for this approach to design are: 
“confusion, expense, and difficulty” [26]. While considering login 
feedback, Blakley asks why the system does not respond to a failed 
attempt with “welcome to your extremely convincing simulated 
fake account” [26].  
The system designed for malicious users’ needs to provide a similar 
experience as Blakley described, but perhaps for different reasons. 
The system must provide an environment in which the user can 
concentrate, it must get the user’s attention, and hold it. Traditional, 
low-interaction honeypot design would include a system with 
seemingly flawed security and what seems like worthwhile data. 
Malicious user experience design needs to hold the users’ attention 
for longer. Opacity is defined as characteristics of the system that 
make it believable. The opacity of the design is important to 
concentration. Any indication that the system has another purpose, 
or that it is not responding normally, will distract and ultimately 
drive away the user [24].  
In order to avoid arousing suspicion, the malicious user’s 
experience must provide the expected level of Blakley’s factors 
(applied to a different purpose): confusion, expense, and difficulty. 
The system must be sufficiently complex and require significant 
time and effort to use. The design should provide challenges that 
matches the user’s skill level (which might be determined by the 
vulnerability that allowed the user entry into the system). In a static 
system, this would mean that the system must be designed for a 
particular user skill level or offer multiple diverging paths 
(different vulnerabilities and data payloads). Designing multiple 
systems may interrupt the opacity of the design, and multiple 
redesigns will be required for each individual “level”.  
6.2 Adaptive game balancing  
We believe that the system may be dynamic and scale to the ability 
level of the user, as many games do via dynamic game balancing. 
Andrade et al. found that adaptive game balancing, in which the 
system adjusts difficulty to the players ability using artificial 
intelligence, had the highest satisfaction rating in usability tests 
[27]. The design should offer malicious users the ability to develop 
their skills. Unlike designing a game, we cannot make up a set of 
mechanics that the player masters. In order to maintain opacity, and 
thus concentration, the design must be based on existing, or 
possibly emerging, security flaws, system configurations, and 
cybersecurity approaches. These could be adaptive, and a robust 
system could offer multiple jumping off points that change and 
adapt to existing users. Users must be rewarded regularly as they 
master specific parts of the system, either with data that appears 
real and valuable, or with additional access to more of the system.  
The system must respond in such a way to maintain the illusion that 
the user is in control and the system is appropriately complex. As a 
simple example, in a command line scenario, the system should 
name system files appropriately but may create data file names that 
are attractive to a malicious user. Taken to the level of parody, this 
would result in files named “passwordhere.txt, breaking the 
immersion and making the systems goals transparent. As with any 
user experience design, malicious or not, the system must balance 
between pushing the agenda of the system’s creators and meeting 
the needs of the user. As Blakley put it, “welcome to your 
extremely convincing simulated fake account” [26].  
6.3 Manufactured reality 
In order to maintain opacity, each “stage” in the authored 
experience for malicious users must clearly lead to the next (“clear 
goals”), via the expected response from the system. This approach 
would require a delicate balancing act between making the reward 
(data or access) apparent, but only after the player explores the 
system further. Immersion must come from all of the above, with 
the possibility that the combination of increasing access and data 
rewards begin to tell a story, however rough, that leads the user 
forward. From the perspective of the rational/analytical thinker, this 
story must maintain opacity, meaning that the system is believable 
and the ultimate goal is sufficiently difficult to attain. 
In a paper on deception-based defenses, Almeshekah and Spafford 
describe the goals of these defenses as: “manufacture reality, alter 
reality, and/or hide reality” [28]. They suggest the creation of 
“plausible alternatives to reality” in order to deceive attackers and 
suggest that these realities should be based on “specific biases in 
how people think” [28]. Immersion, above all, appears to be the 
user research-based goal that is key to malicious user design. 
Malicious user design must manufacture realities that are plausible 
to malicious users with a strong preference for rational thinking. 
Almeshekah and Spafford’s review of categories of cultural biases 
will be instructive in designing malicious user focused systems that 
provide plausible realities. 
6.4 Social interaction 
Finally, and secondary to immersion in importance to both game 
and malicious users, is social interaction. We know that game users 
and malicious users communicate in small groups, read information 
published by other users, and congregate online and in person. 
Designing an adaptive system for a single user without reducing or 
eliminating opacity seems possible. Doing so for a user base that 
communicates regularly (and in places not readily available to the 
designers) is far more difficult. A system cannot adapt to multiple 
players and, at the same time, seem like a real system with flawed 
security, if those users compare notes.  
However, the research regarding social interaction is helpful in 
considering vectors for learning whether communication about our 
system reaches hacker communities, and potentially getting 
feedback on whether there is discussion about our current system 
iteration, and whether it is convincing. If it is not, monitoring 
hacker social interaction could prove valuable in the next iteration. 
More experimentally, and forward thinking, could a system use 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning to provide more 
immersive interaction? The complexity of applying AI to social 
engineering and the challenge of constructing a convincing “chat 
bot” that passes for human is beyond the scope of our current 
research. However, some simpler uses of Markov chains to 
determine the location of phishers is promising in showing how AI 
communication could, at minimum, be used to draw malicious 
users toward a system [29]. 
6.5 A system for the malicious user 
We expect that the initial prototype(s) will be indistinguishable by 
some from a honeypot, and especially from a context honeypot. It 
will likely be limited in scope and need to have a beginning and 
end, with a specific goal or set of goals the user is guided toward. 
Further research is needed into variations in malicious user skill 
level. This would allow us to develop at least a limited scope of the 
levels of game challenge, e.g. “beginning,” “intermediate,” and 
“advanced.”  
The malicious user design approach does not begin with the goal of 
collecting data on malicious users any more than Facebook and 
Twitter begin with the goal of collecting data on users, which is to 
say that it is the goal but only by way of creating a construct for 
users to provide data while doing other things. Like those corporate, 
social media projects, a malicious user design must create an 
experience on which to base the collection of data. In our approach, 
data collection is intended for user research and research 
documentation. We have not identified a goal for the system to 
complete, other than immersing the malicious user as long as 
possible, to create and maintain a flow state. In this, our prototype 
goals are similar to those of designers of video gambling machines. 
Those systems are intended to keep their users immersed until they 
run out of money or spend so much money that they can no longer 
maintain a flow state. Our research is not intended to build either 
an offensive or defensive tool for cybersecurity. We feel that 
remaining focused on malicious design earnestly, with the same 
care that immersive game designers take in crafting games, offers 
more opportunities for innovation in malicious user design and in 
cybersecurity. 
7. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
The initial research into game users and malicious users in this 
paper seems promising, in terms of approach, but it is far from 
concrete. User research in the field, and in practice in industry, is 
often based on incomplete information coupled with prototyping 
and testing. Our goal in this paper was to collect and analyze initial 
user research upon which to build a prototype for malicious users, 
and in this, we feel we have enough to go on.  
7.1 Approach limitations 
The GameFlow framework provides one possible approach to 
malicious user design, and one that appears to match our interest in 
approaching malicious user design in parallel to research based on 
game users. However, the GameFlow framework is an adaptation 
of flow theory that has not been developed as a full evaluation tool 
for games, and the flow theory it was based on is similarly complex 
and difficult to prove definitively. Our experimental research with 
a malicious user design prototype may contribute to research on 
flow as it relates to hacking, and flow within games. 
7.2 Technical requirements 
Adaptive game balancing offers a conceptual research direction 
that can scale to the level of our prototype implementation. The 
primary questions driving technical limitations is how deep and 
long can the flow state of immersion be maintained. As an example 
scenario, we can imagine an initial prototype made up of a 
simulated command line (which may include or use an actual 
command line), files that contain data the user is lead to believe are 
valuable (via location and name) but which contain data that prods 
the user to further explore the system. Adaptive game balancing in 
this simple prototype may adapt the difficulty of vulnerabilities 
based on the exploit the user employed to access the system. There 
may be multiple access points representing different systems. At 
the present time, the scope of designing the content (scenarios) of 
an initial simple prototype is more complex than designing the 
technical system to support it.  
7.3 Potential future research 
We intend to apply a quick iterative approach to prototyping this 
system, although “quick” will be a relative term in relationship to 
the complexity of the task at hand. The next stage of development, 
iterations of prototypes based on the research at hand, can occur in 
parallel to further malicious user research, including social 
research. We feel we have only scratched the surface in the 
comparison of malicious users to game users. 
There is a distinct opportunity to further explore social engineering 
as it relates to the malicious user design profile contained in this 
paper. There is a relatively recent field of game design referred to 
as “alternate reality” gaming, which mixes interaction and game 
events that occur in real life and online. These games rely heavily 
on online social interaction between players that is outside the 
control of the designers, but that is sometimes influenced by 
“actors” who participate in the game to invisibly guide the 
interaction toward specific goals. Developing an alternate reality 
game requires socially engineering the players. Alternate reality 
game design includes all of the game factors discussed above, as 
well as complexly timed events and non-linear storytelling Its 
potential as a model for malicious user design may add unnecessary 
complexity to an already complex initial prototype. However, 
future research may include iterations based on alternate reality 
game approaches. Additionally, the system we have described may 
have uses for researchers in addictive games, online games, and 
alternate reality games. Our system might also be useful to better 
understand the health aspects of video game addition, or “gaming 
disorder,” which is being added to the World Health Organization’s 
new draft list of diseases, with the classification expected to 
become official in 2019 [30].  
7.4 Ethical, implementation, and 
experimentation limits 
As mentioned above, honeypots have been discussed as possibly 
crossing over into entrapment, inducing people to commit crimes 
that would not ordinarily commit. People attempting to access a 
honeypot believe they are, by definition, committing a crime or, at 
minimum, accessing a system or account without the owner’s 
permission. They will likely attempt to mask their identity in 
multiple ways. For example, it is not plausible to identify the age 
of a malicious user visiting a honeypot.  
The use of this system will require time and a segment of the 
population of malicious users conduct their activities for multiple 
reasons, including finical gain. There are ethical implications in 
creating a system that distracts users from their intended purpose 
for as long as possible. Our review of research includes evidence 
that many malicious users are not adults, and thus our prototype 
could conceivably attract users who are legally children. These 
issues are already a consideration in existing games, as well as 
social media [31]–[33].  
Renaud and Warkentin consider risk in information security 
research as it relates to ethics and, specifically, to Institutional 
Review Boards (IRB) in the United States [34]. They speculate that 
a typical IRB would not approve research that puts subjects at risk 
for encountering malware on their personal device. Given the lack 
of consent necessary for an opaque malicious user design 
experience (the user cannot know they are part of an experiment 
and thus cannot consent), the lack of identifying factors that would 
allow excluding children from the research (or even knowing 
whether children were included), and the fact that to participate in 
the system at all, users must believe they accessing the system 
without the owner’s permission, it seems possible that our 
prototype will never be implemented as university research. 
However, Renaud and Warkentin suggest that we find a way 
forward directly, and that “we should write well-argued 
motivations for our studies, in terms of benefits to society as a 
whole; Assuming that such studies would be turned down is 
perhaps overly naïve” [34]. 
We believe that our research benefits the society as a whole by 
offering a divergent approach to researching malicious users, who 
are a worldwide threat to privacy and security. The research is a 
combination of an unorthodox, interdisciplinary perspective and 
approach, and a willingness to put together interdisciplinary user 
research to move toward a prototype. The next step in this research 
is to build a prototype using the GameFlow framework, based on 
“plausible alternatives to reality,” and targeted toward the general 
profile of malicious users contained in this paper. 
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